actions by reason of our
being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end,
but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).
Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those
actions of which we are masters.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 2]

Whether the Will Desires of Necessity, Whatever It Desires?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of
necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will
tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as
the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable
necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's
object moves it of necessity.

Obj. 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of
the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is
the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will.
But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of
necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals
are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems that whatever is
apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the
will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to
opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all
things whatsoever it desires.

_I answer that,_ The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it
desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the
intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles,
so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A. 1).
Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary
connection with the first principles; such as contingent
propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the
first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of
necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary
connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable
conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first
principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when
once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions
with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until