form of the sense in act. Hence it does not
follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually
understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: In these words "the thing actually understood" there
is a double implication--the thing which is understood, and the fact
that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal"
imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or
universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be
understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in
individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as
universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in
the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its
smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen
apart from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen
is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell,
this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight
receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner
humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be
apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be
abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to
humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the
intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but
not of the principles of individuality.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in
regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes
place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is
formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of
an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these
operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there
is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the
intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed
forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a
word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and
a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words
do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but
that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging
of external things.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 3]

Whether the More Universa