cognitive power, but on
account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would
perceive hearing rather than color.
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QUESTION 86
WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS
(In Four Articles)
We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it knows singulars?
(2) Whether it knows the infinite?
(3) Whether it knows contingent things?
(4) Whether it knows future things?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 4]
Whether Our Intellect Knows Singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For
whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our
intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs
to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows
this singular, Socrates.
Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But
action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows
the singular.
Obj. 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it
is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for
actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.
Obj. 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an
inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore,
can the intellect know it.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the
universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense."
_I answer that,_ Our intellect cannot know the singular in material
things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the
principle of singularity in material things is individual matter,
whereas our intellect, as have said above (Q. 85, A. 1), understands
by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is
abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our
intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as
it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because,
as we have said above (Q. 85, A. 7), even after abstracting the
intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to
turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said
_De Anima_ iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly
through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular
represented by the phantasm. An
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