quoted, "Now, I know in part."

Reply Obj. 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily
stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the
future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however,
cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better
man.

Reply Obj. 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same
species, so there is no impossibility.

Reply Obj. 4: This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on
the part of the sensitive powers.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 6]

Whether the Act of Knowledge Acquired Here Remains in the Separated
Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired
does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De
Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither
remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known is an
act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of
knowledge here acquired.

Obj. 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in
the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But
in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without
turning to phantasms, as shown above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore the
separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by
intelligible species acquired in this life.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits
produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But the
habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning
to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts,
however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in
the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired
in this life.

_On the contrary,_ It was said to Dives in hell (Luke 16:25):
"Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime."

_I answer that,_ Action offers two things for our consideration--its
species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the
faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which
is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the
power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the
species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due
to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species
remain in the separated sou