ts, which the
rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a
"trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts,
the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the
reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the
way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents
something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace"
represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause
in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For
imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called
"traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the
land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures
and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the
Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of
the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature,
rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the
representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only
in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A.
2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in
them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we
consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is
distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of
Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say
that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word
in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there
exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation
of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the
principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a
certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced
them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite
nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species
points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a
house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the
maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end;
as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So
we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind;
but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."

Reply Obj. 1