the woman was deceived.
Obj. 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from
us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not
changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state
of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of
what he saw, just as he is deceived now.
Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep
the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things
themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and
consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been
deceived, adhering to images as to realities.
Obj. 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other
men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above
(A. 3). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things,
he would have been deceived.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard
what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a
punishment of man condemned."
_I answer that,_ in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things;
namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as
though it were true, but without the assent of belief--or it may mean
a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of
these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended;
but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might
have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term
for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with
the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion
in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is
not to be blamed.
Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of
the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and
while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as
truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of
innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to
assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such
as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man,
though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect
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