the like; neither
had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed
then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard
present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had
at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed
in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in
ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is
not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall
and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's
judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some
extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was
wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the
soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.
Reply Obj. 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of
the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of
innocence.
Reply Obj. 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence
as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as
will be explained later on (Q. 97, A. 2); likewise the soul was
impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of
reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away
the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he
ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in _Ethic._
iii, 11.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 3]
Whether Adam Had All the Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For
some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate
concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by
fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed
in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.
Obj. 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which
have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with
fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as
stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.
Obj. 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed.
Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state
of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither
did those virtues exist.
Obj. 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not;
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