n some degree gifted
with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the
faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness
directly after death.
Reply Obj. 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels
or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed
grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before
being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being
so confirmed.
Reply Obj. 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of
those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state
of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet
it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he
could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.
Reply Obj. 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is
nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the
first moment of his existence.
Reply Obj. 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit
grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 2]
Whether Passions Existed in the Soul of the First Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions.
For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit"
(Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence.
Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the
soul.
Obj. 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body
was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
Obj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral
virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the
passions were entirely excluded from him.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our
first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions
of the soul.
_I answer that,_ The passions of the soul are in the sensual
appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some
passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy;
others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the
primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any
good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion
with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and
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