as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every
virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state
of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to
be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra
Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the
slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty,
restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness."

_I answer that,_ in the state of innocence man in a certain sense
possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes.
For it was shown above (A. 1) that such was the rectitude of the
primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers
to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby
reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according
to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the
Virtues (I-II, Q. 63, A. 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the
primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every
virtue.

It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do
not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these
virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit
and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply
imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If
such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive
state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which
is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed.
For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the
Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final
beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state,
both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies
imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state,
could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for
instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which
is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and
unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive
state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but
not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if
there had been a sin to repent for; and