elongs to the bodily state of the first man:
first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as
regards the preservation of the species.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?

(2) Whether he was impassible?

(3) Whether he stood in need of food?

(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not
immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But
if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined.
Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Obj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically
distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there
can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first
man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present
state.

Obj. 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence,
this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature,
for since nature does not change within the same species, he would
also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to
grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to
Wis. 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have
regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore
man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward,
according to Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not
created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward.
Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:12): "By sin death came into
the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.

_I answer that,_ A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First,
on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses
no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in
potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things
as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is
incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible,
yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from