a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it
cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore
can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God
preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.
Obj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of
its _becoming,_ but also of its being. But all created causes do not
seem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they
cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they
do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.
_On the contrary,_ A thing is kept in being by that which gives it
being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.
Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in
being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or
hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and
_per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as
the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a
created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in
corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of
corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just
as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many
other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as
to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one
another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first
and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way
on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal
cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the
middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle
cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.
For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and
continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the
diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated;
whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of
diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner
astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those
things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God
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