uld seem that God cannot do anything outside the
established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against
nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be
against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural
order.
Obj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order
of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice;
for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do
anything outside the order of nature.
Obj. 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it
God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He
is changeable; which cannot be said.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God
sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of
nature."
_I answer that,_ From each cause there results a certain order to its
effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders,
subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore
a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but
conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the
father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the
ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king,
by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.
If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first
cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so,
He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.
But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary
cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not
subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this
order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural
necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have
created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something
outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by
producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by
producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts against the wonted
course of nature, but by no means does He act against
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