erformed by the
intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds
from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand
is given to the one who understands.
Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of
the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but
it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so
far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of
which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses
which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to
enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence,
as we have seen above (Q. 12, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 3). Hence He moves the
created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we
have explained (Q. 12, A. 4).
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 4]
Whether God Can Move the Created Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For
whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot
be moved by God.
Obj. 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at
the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be
voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.
Therefore God cannot move the will.
Obj. 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to
the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but
to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that
voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But
this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh
in us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
_I answer that,_ As the intellect is moved by the object and by the
Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the
will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the
power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object,
but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move
a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover
surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable.
Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal goo
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