d; for
its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect
is the universal being. But every created good is some particular
good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the
capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In
like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will
is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which
is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs
to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just
as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs
the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both
ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second
way by an interior inclination of the will.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its
natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is
made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not
forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it,
because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within,
that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be
caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is
not repugnant to being moved by another.

Reply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be
moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed
for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not
prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2),
it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 5]

Whether God Works in Every Agent?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For
we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works
in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be
superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

Obj. 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from
two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two
movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God
operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from
the creature; and so no creature works at all.