had he seen unhappiness in his
neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in
accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what
is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally;
as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic.
iv, 9).
Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue
superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which
happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are
_per se_ competent to moderate the passions.
Reply Obj. 2: Passions which have evil for their object were
incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil
be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But
passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with
the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could
hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the
virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive
state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions
which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions
only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in
habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other
virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but
to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but
also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also
to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the
primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner,
fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating
sorrow and fear.
Reply Obj. 3: appears from what has been said above.
Reply Obj. 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as
a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice
of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In
another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a
certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did
not possess perseverance.
Reply Obj. 5: appears from what has been said above.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 4]
Whether the Actions of the First Man Were Less Meritorious Than Ours
Are?
Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were
less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us
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