would have sufficed."
_I answer that,_ Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality
causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15).
Now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and
adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true.
Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both
as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some
perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of
comparison between "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble
to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good
is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he
is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness
may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it
is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1):
and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as
it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image
is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation
is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from
image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things,
and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than
the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be
seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit"
(namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. "But
the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties,
or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's
likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the
likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for
corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.
But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the
expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being,
endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a
likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the
same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for
there is no virtue without love of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general
notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far
as any "likeness" falls short of "ima
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