and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering
the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the
actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of
the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by
the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers.
Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain
facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid
sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action
of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible
object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in
the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively
in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to
habit.
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in
the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers;
but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain;
because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form
may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its
contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its
subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not
corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an
incorruptible faculty, as above stated (Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Neither
can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted
by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible
"intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a
thing is." But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards
mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what
is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus
knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument
seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the
Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge
is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the
memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false argument.
But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must
conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the
intellect, remains in the separated soul.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit,
but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the
assertion
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