: The intellect does not know the singular by way of
abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as
explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to
those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of
determinate relation, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to all
singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore
there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 5]

Whether the Habit of Knowledge Here Acquired Remains in the Separated
Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in
this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for
the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 13:8).

Obj. 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge
denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of
knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some
who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are
better; which seems unreasonable.

Obj. 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence
of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here
acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two
forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which
cannot be.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4, 5), that "a
habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is
destroyed by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no
change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of
knowledge is destroyed by death.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn
on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven."

_I answer that,_ Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in
the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the
imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible
species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it
would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here
acquired would also be entirely destroyed.

But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode
of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of
knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive
powers