example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the
relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that
Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for
contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality
belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because
whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But
matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes
from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover
it was laid down above (A. 1) that the intellect of itself and
directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense
is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the
intellect, as we have said above (A. 1). Therefore the contingent,
considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the
intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent
things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the
objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is
of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus
some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.
From which the replies to the objections are clear.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 4]
Whether Our Intellect Can Know the Future?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For
our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from
the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it
can know the present. Therefore it can know the future.
Obj. 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know
some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect
is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the
intellect of its own nature can know the future.
Obj. 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any
knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows
by their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can
the intellect know the future.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 8:6, 7), "There is a great
affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things
to come he cannot know by any messenger."
_I answer that,_ We must apply the same distinction to future things,
as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things
considered as subject to time are
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