s that "the man is something having whiteness": and the subject,
which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is
the same with the composition of form and matter: for animal
signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has
an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that
which has all these things together with individual matter; and
according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the
composition of one thing with another.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 6]
Whether the Intellect Can Be False?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood
are in the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same, as is
shown above (Q. 79, A. 1). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.
Obj. 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But
falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.
Obj. 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves
falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (Prov. 14:22). Therefore
falsehood can be in the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone
who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is
deceived." And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the
intellect is always true."
_I answer that,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect
with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper
object, as sight in regard to color; [unless] accidentally through
some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ--for example, the taste
of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through
his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be
deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when,
for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas
in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived
concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that
vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason of
this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is _per se_ directed to
its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same.
Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own
proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect
is the "quiddity" of a material
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