ts in the
intellect understanding a thing as it is.

Reply Obj. 3: The difference of form which is due only to the
different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a
numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms,
diversified according to the difference of matter.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 8]

Whether the Intellect Understands the Indivisible Before the
Divisible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the
indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i,
1) that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and
elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements are of
divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the
divisible.

Obj. 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known
previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more
known," as is said _Topic._ vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the
definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of
a line; for as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the
extremities of which are points"; also unity comes into the
definition of number, for "number is multitude measured by one," as
is said _Metaph._ x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands
the indivisible before the divisible.

Obj. 3: Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is more
like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the intellect
is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the
indivisible.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible
is expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily.
Therefore likewise is the indivisible.

_I answer that,_ The object of our intellect in its present state
is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the
phantasms, as above stated (Q. 84, A. 7). And since that which is
known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper
object, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order
to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the
indivisible is threefold, as is said _De Anima_ iii, 6. First, the
continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although
potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its
division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge
is prior to distinct knowledge, as we h