from the mode of
understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of
knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato
thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and
substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered,
according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of
existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi,
13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as
existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a
formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the
result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the
generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the
fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken
from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is
taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken
from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the
intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature
is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because
the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of
the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of
any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through
sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and
sometimes conversely.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 4]

Whether We Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that we can understand many things at the
same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of
before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not
understand different things in succession, but at the same time.

Obj. 2: Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not
opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as,
for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible
species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different
intelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the
same time.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time,
such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore
the intellect understands many things at the same time.

Obj. 4: Further, we