l Is First in Our Intellectual Cognition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in
our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its
own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves.
But universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is
first which does not involve the existence of its correlative"
(Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as
regards our intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to
us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known
secondarily by us.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object
defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition.
But the more universal is part of the definition of the less
universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore
the universals are secondarily known by us.
Obj. 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But
universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known
by us.
_On the contrary,_ "We must proceed from the universal to the
singular and individual" (Phys. i, 1)
_I answer that,_ In our knowledge there are two things to be
considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises
from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and
individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for
its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before
our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our
intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of
actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to
actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium
between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect
act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the
object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete
act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly,
and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known
partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher
says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us
at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its
principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object
that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing
contained in
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