he thing known, the more perfect is its
knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not
only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of
matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the
form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to
material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most
perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have
remarked above (Q. 78, A. 3): while among intellects the more perfect
is the more immaterial.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an
intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence
must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early
philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all
things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material
things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all
things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause.
God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence:
but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary
vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the
formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just
as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this
way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some
part of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we
say that a body is made into something colored because of its being
informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what
follows. For he says that the soul "keeps something"--namely, not
informed with such image--"which is able freely to judge of the
species of these images": and that this is the "mind" or "intellect."
And he says that the part which is informed with these
images--namely, the imagination--is "common to us and beasts."

Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually
composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that
the soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in
potentiality to all--through the senses, to all things
sensible--through the intellect, to all things intelligible.

Reply Obj. 3: Every creature has a finite and determinate essence.
Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain
likeness to the lower creature, forasmuc