cted therein. In
this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all
things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all
things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types. Secondly,
one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of
knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by
the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all
things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we
know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is
nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in
which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps. 4:6,
7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which question the
Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed
upon us," as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light
in us, all things are made known to us.
But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible
species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us
to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge
is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the
Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas
sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16):
"Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all
things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able
to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds
of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for
this information from the story of times and places?"
But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their
"eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the eternal
types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu.
46)--viz. that "not each and every rational soul can be said to be
worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those
that are holy and pure," such as the souls of the blessed.
From what has been said the objections are easily solved.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 6]
Whether Intellectual Knowledge Is Derived from Sensible Things?
Objection 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived
from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we
cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the
body.
|