f the individual, whereas the intellect does.

Reply Obj. 3: Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms,
are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are
phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which
we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we
know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other
incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by
way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And,
therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need
to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of
the things themselves.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 8]

Whether the Judgment of the Intellect Is Hindered Through Suspension
of the Sensitive Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not
hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does
not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is
higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is
not hindered through suspension of the senses.

Obj. 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during
sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in _De Somn. et Vigil._ i
and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep.
Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through
suspension of the senses.

_On the contrary,_ What a man does while asleep, against the moral
law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had
free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the
intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses.

_I answer that,_ As we have said above (A. 7), our intellect's proper
and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a
perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all
that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be
ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher
says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is
action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived
principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek
knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that
he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the
natural philosopher does not