t ideas, for
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that "ideas are permanent types
existing in the Divine mind." If therefore we say that the
intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back
to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from
them.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see
that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is
true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor
do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth
which is above our minds." Now the unchangeable truth is contained in
the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true
things in the eternal types.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If
those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was
true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as
from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are
spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be
careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens."
Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of
the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with
faith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary to
faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above (A. 4), that
the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and
these he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our
intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by
participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect,
by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since
it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, outside
the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held,
asserting that _per se_ life or _per se_ wisdom are creative
substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine
(QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the
types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to
which types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the
human soul.

When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all
things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to
be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known;
as one may see in a mirror the images of things refle