" which are objects of the will, "are in things," but "truth
and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind."
When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the
soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such
a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing
which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison
with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the
love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the
contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love
thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.

Reply Obj. 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one
thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found
to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and
extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something
true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect
is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most
excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.

Reply Obj. 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less
perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act,
and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely
and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes
potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the
motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes
the passive; for good which is understood moves the will.

Reply Obj. 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with
what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love
God.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 4]

Whether the Will Moves the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect.
For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves
is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5).
But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above
(A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except
perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the
good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas
the