does not consider the common notion of
good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And
therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by
the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible
regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to
the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the
notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is
hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of
good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite,
there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in
the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a
concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are
the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of
the senses.

Reply Obj. 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in
two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions--arising, that is,
with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly
understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive
appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they
are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and
thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are
attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they
do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is
called the will.

Reply Obj. 2: The will itself may be said to [be] irascible, as far
as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion,
but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may
be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And
thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that
is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may
understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible
and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the
body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time),
although there is no need to have faith in what that book says.
Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.
_______________________

QUESTION 83

OF FREE-WILL
(In Four Articles)

We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man has free-will?

(2) What is free-will--a power, an act, or a habit?