instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute
animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power
he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this
judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural
instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he
acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to
various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite
courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments.
Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such
matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not
determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary
that man have a free-will.

Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 81, A. 3, ad 2), the
sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case
can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore
the good which man does not when he wishes--namely, "not to desire
against reason," as Augustine says.

Reply Obj. 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as
though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but
because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved
and helped by God.

Reply Obj. 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by
his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity
belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of
itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be
the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes
both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He
does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary
causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but
rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates
in each thing according to its own nature.

Reply Obj. 4: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of
his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The
choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.

Reply Obj. 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and
adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual
part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore,
that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the
intellectual part, he naturally desires his las