t end, which is
happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not
subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (Q.
82, AA. 1, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be
such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a
temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by
corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it
is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue
of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because
from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject
something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of
reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (Q. 81, A.
3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which
a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even
these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such
qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to
acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them,
or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant
to free-will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 2]

Whether Free-Will Is a Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For
free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an
act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.

Obj. 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and
reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to
a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De
Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of
disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power.

Obj. 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But
free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by
abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is
not a power.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of
a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which
it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.

_I answer that,_ Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium--i.e. free
judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of
speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the a