petitive of universal good--and as
a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If,
therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another
according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as
we have said above (A. 3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler
than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the
common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then
again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under
the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and
its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will,
and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of
things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of
being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common
nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and
a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its
object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are
contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is
higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily
understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because
the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the
intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth,
inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as
it is a desired good.
Reply Obj. 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will
moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.
Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must
stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement
of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every
apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle
of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher
than our intellect--namely, God--as also Aristotle says (Eth.
Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need
to proceed indefinitely.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 5]
Whether We Should Distinguish Irascible and Concupiscible Parts in
the Superior Appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and
concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For
the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere"
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