not as
executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to
it according to its mode of apprehension.

Reply Obj. 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is
something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is
something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as
the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the
aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth;
so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the
operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect
knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth
to operation.

Reply Obj. 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers,
which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said
above (A. 7, ad 2; Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4).
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 12]

Whether Synderesis Is a Special Power of the Soul Distinct from the
Others?

Objection 1: It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power,
distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one
division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome
on Ezech. 1:6, "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the
concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore
"synderesis" is a power.

Obj. 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But
"synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because
"synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites
to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from
Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that
"synderesis" is a power just as sensuality is.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the
natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of
virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call
synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our
judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is the same as reason:
and thus it is a power.

_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2),
"rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not
regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis"
is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power,
since it is not found in brute animals.

_I ans