orbids, or
unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the
irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not
conclude that they do not obey.
Reply Obj. 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior
sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which
is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and
apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are
subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify
the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the
phantasms of the imagination.
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QUESTION 82
OF THE WILL
(In Five Articles)
We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?
(2) Whether it desires everything of necessity?
(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?
(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?
(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 1]
Whether the Will Desires Something of Necessity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing of
necessity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything
is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is
voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of
necessity.
Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a
rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is
in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and
therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.
Obj. 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But
we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act
of the will cannot be necessitated.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire
happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but
contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the
will desires something of necessity.
_I answer that,_ The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For
that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong
to it by an intrinsic principle--either material, as when we say that
everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible--or
formal, as when we say that it is n
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