ntelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable
or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not
material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Reply Obj. 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a
natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the
natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which
natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the
apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to
this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing;
but simply as suitable to the animal.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 2]

Whether the Sensitive and Intellectual Appetites Are Distinct Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual
appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated
by accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 3). But
it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by
the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and
intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.

Obj. 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it
is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things.
But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part:
for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual
things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual
thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from
the sensitive.

Obj. 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is
subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the
motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from
the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a
like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a
double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite
moves the lower.

_I answer that,_ We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a
distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power
is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended:
wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved,
while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in _De
Anima_ iii, 10 and _Metaph._ xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and
movabl