we do. Wherefore, properly speaking,
conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act,
sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural
habit--namely, "synderesis": thus Jerome calls "synderesis"
conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the
"natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22]
says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for
causes and effects to be called after one another.
Reply Obj. 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the
same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the
mind.
Reply Obj. 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject,
but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is
defiled.
Reply Obj. 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet
it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the
habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless
have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first
principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special
reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said
above.
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QUESTION 80
OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL
(In Two Articles)
Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are
four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general;
second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the
first there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the
soul?
(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and
sensitive as distinct powers?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 1]
Whether the Appetite Is a Special Power of the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power
of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those
things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But
appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire
good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite
is not a special power of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what
we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power
is not distinct from the apprehensive power.
Obj. 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each
power of
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