.
Reply Obj. 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according to
the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For
"opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side
of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or
"measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain
principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word
"mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed
judgment with approval.
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TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 10]
Whether Intelligence Is a Power Distinct from Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than
the intellect. For we read in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that "when we wish
to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid,
then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards
intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers.
Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense
considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another,
intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason.
Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from
intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.
Obj. 3: Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from
others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; but that
intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that
which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is
called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man,
examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is,
wisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly
internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the
tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that
"intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing
false." But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect.
Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.
_I answer that,_ This word "intelligence" properly signifies the
intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some
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