ch it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that
rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to
one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a
thing is moved towards a certain place, and rests in that place. Much
more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and
so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.
Reply Obj. 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of
actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that
book is not of great authority.
Reply Obj. 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For
eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus
Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.
Reply Obj. 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they
cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But
man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible
truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of
knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the
human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 9]
Whether the Higher and Lower Reason Are Distinct Powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are
distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the
image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in
the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the
higher and lower reason are two powers.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason
flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the
higher reason is another power from the lower.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the
scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary
things, is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative"
and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he
proves this from the principle that for those things which are
"generically different, generically different parts of the soul are
ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as
corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same
as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what
the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the
higher reason, which, a
|