to some particular thing, namely, the body as united
to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being
nobler than such an active one.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 3]

Whether There Is an Active Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as
the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things
intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible,
the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since
our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that
we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is
passive.

Obj. 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something
active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight,
inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of
its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the
intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into
act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the
patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive
intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature
suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form
is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial.
Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the
species actually intelligible.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in
every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes
all things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we
must admit an active intellect.

_I answer that,_ According to the opinion of Plato, there is no
need for an active intellect in order to make things actually
intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to
the intellect, as will be explained farther on (A. 4). For Plato
supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from
matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is
actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And
he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of
which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that
individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and
species: and that our intellect was formed by such p