Objection 1: It would seem that the active intellect is not something
in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light
for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher
than the soul: according to John 1:9, "He was the true light that
enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active
intellect is not something in the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active
intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not
understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it
understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active
intellect is not something in our soul.

Obj. 3: Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore,
the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something
belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an
active power: it follows that a man would always be able to
understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the
active intellect is not something in our soul.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the
active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can
be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If,
therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all
things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible
for the active intellect to be also something in our soul.

Obj. 5: Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul,
it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since
habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the
passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the
passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But
every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore
follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul.
And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from
some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active
intellect is not something in our soul.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it
is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active
intellect, "to be in the soul."

_I answer that,_ The active intellect, of which the Philosopher
speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we
must observe that above the intellectual soul o