es Are Suitably Distinguished?
Objection 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably
distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper.
Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior
sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of
apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the
proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things;
for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem
to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the
action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it
seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as
being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other
senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior
power, called the common sense.
Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin.
i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first
sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore
memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from
the senses.
Obj. 4: Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any
power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what
it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that
"those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." Therefore much
less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call
the "estimative" power, for the perception of intentions which the
sense does not perceive.
Obj. 5: Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists
in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the
reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for
the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the
estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative
is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add
the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative
powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made
distinct from the imagination.
Obj. 6: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7, 24) describes
three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the
sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy;
and intellectual, which is an act
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