il from its end.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Differ. _Topic._ ii) that "if the
end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing
also is evil."

_I answer that,_ The disposition of things as to goodness is the same
as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does
not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their
being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on
something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their
being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as
the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the
goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons,
Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is
not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the
goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of
goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness
which is in them absolutely.

Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.
First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because
as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as
stated above (A. 1). Secondly, it has goodness according to its
species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has
goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its
accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is
compared as to the cause of its goodness.

Reply Obj. 1: The good in view of which one acts is not always a true
good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good.
And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless
due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to
the action.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the
ways mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus
it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its
circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an
action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since
"evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete
cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 5]

Whether a Human Action Is Good or Evil in Its Species?

Object