borne in mind that in the latter case there was no means of forcing
the ships to leave their strong position; whereas by threatening
Trincomalee, or other less important points, Suffren could rely upon
drawing Hughes out. He was therefore right in not attacking, while the
English before Newport were probably wrong.

[173] The dependence of Trincomalee upon the English fleet in this
campaign affords an excellent illustration of the embarrassment and
false position in which a navy finds itself when the defence of its
seaports rests upon it. This bears upon a much debated point of the
present day, and is worthy the study of those who maintain, too
unqualifiedly, that the best coast defence is a navy. In one sense
this is doubtless true,--to attack the enemy abroad is the best of
defences; but in the narrow sense of the word "defence" it is not
true. Trincomalee unfortified was simply a centre round which Hughes
had to revolve like a tethered animal; and the same will always happen
under like conditions.

[174] Plate XIV., Fig. D, shows the order of battle Suffren intended
in this action. The five rear ships of the enemy would each have two
opponents close aboard. The leading French ship on the weather side
was to be kept farther off, so that while attacking the sixth
Englishman she could "contain" the van ships if they attempted to
reinforce the rear by tacking.

[175] Troude: Batailles Navales.

[176] Between four and five hundred yards.

[177] The English and French flag-ships are denoted in the plan by
their exceptional size.

[178] The "Victory," Nelson's ship at Trafalgar, a 100-gun ship, lost
57 killed and 102 wounded; Hughes's ship, a 74, lost 59 killed and 96
wounded. Collingwood's ship, the "Royal Sovereign," also of 100 guns,
lost 47 killed and 94 wounded; the "Monmouth," a 64, in Hughes's
action lost 45 killed and 102 wounded.

[179] Troude: Batailles Navales; Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine
Francaise.

[180] This remark seems too self-evident to need emphasis; yet it may
be questioned whether naval men generally carry it in their stock of
axioms.

[181] As always.

[182] That is turned their side to the enemy instead of approaching
him.

[183] Chevalier.

[184] Annual Register, 1782.

[185] The British account differs materially as to the cause of the
distance separating the two rears. "In this action it did not fall to
the 'Monmouth's' lot to sustain a very considerable share, the enemy's
rea