the skill and conduct of his captains,
made signal for the ships ahead to carry a press of sail, and gain
their positions regardless of the danger to the threatened rear. The
latter, closely pressed and outnumbered, stood on unswervingly,
shortened sail, and came to anchor, one by one, in a line ahead (B,
B'), under the roar of the guns of their baffled enemies. The latter
filed by, delivered their fire, and bore off again to the southward,
leaving their former berths to their weaker but clever antagonists.

[Illustration: Pl. XIX. HOOD & DE GRASSE. JAN. 25, 1782.]

The anchorage thus brilliantly taken by Hood was not exactly the same
as that held by De Grasse the day before; but as it covered and
controlled it, his claim that he took up the place the other had left
is substantially correct. The following night and morning were spent
in changing and strengthening the order, which was finally established
as follows (Plate XVIII., B, B'). The van ship was anchored about four
miles southeast from Basse Terre, so close to the shore that a ship
could not pass inside her, nor, with the prevailing wind, even reach
her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position.
From this point the line extended in a west-northwest direction to the
twelfth or thirteenth ship (from a mile and a quarter to a mile and a
half), where it turned gradually but rapidly to north, the last six
ships being on a north and south line. Hood's flag-ship, the
"Barfleur," of ninety guns, was at the apex of the salient angle thus
formed.

It would not have been impossible for the French fleet to take the
anchorage they formerly held; but it and all others to leeward were
forbidden by the considerations already stated, so long as Hood
remained where he was. It became necessary therefore to dislodge him,
but this was rendered exceedingly difficult by the careful tactical
dispositions that have been described. His left flank was covered by
the shore. Any attempt to enfilade his front by passing along the
other flank was met by the broadsides of the six or eight ships drawn
up _en potence_ to the rear. The front commanded the approaches to
Basse Terre. To attack him in the rear, from the northwest, was
forbidden by the trade-wind. To these difficulties was to be added
that the attack must be made under sail against ships at anchor, to
whom loss of spars would be of no immediate concern; and which, having
springs[196] out, could train th