to the
factor which controlled it.

To appreciate the consequences of this neglect, and the real
indecisiveness of this celebrated battle, we must go forward a year
and listen to the debates in Parliament on the conditions of peace, in
February, 1783. The approval or censure of the terms negotiated by the
existing ministry involved the discussion of many considerations; but
the gist of the dispute was, whether the conditions were such as the
comparative financial and military situations of the belligerents
justified, or whether it would have been better for England to
continue the war rather than submit to the sacrifices she had made. As
regards the financial condition, despite the gloomy picture drawn by
the advocates of the peace, there was probably no more doubt then than
there is now about the comparative resources of the different
countries. The question of military strength was really that of naval
power. The ministry argued that the whole British force hardly
numbered one hundred sail-of-the-line, while the navies of France and
Spain amounted to one hundred and forty, not to speak of that of
Holland.

"With so glaring an inferiority, what hopes of success could we
derive, either from the experience of the last campaign, or from
any new distribution of our force in that which would have
followed? In the West Indies we could not have had more than
forty-six sail to oppose to forty, which on the day that peace
was signed lay in Cadiz Bay, with sixteen thousand troops on
board, ready to sail for that quarter of the world, where they
would have been joined by twelve of the line from Havana and
ten from San Domingo.... Might we not too reasonably apprehend
that the campaign in the West Indies would have closed with the
loss of Jamaica itself, the avowed object of this immense
armament?"[220]

These are certainly the reasonings of an avowed partisan, for which
large allowances must be made. The accuracy of the statement of
comparative numbers was denied by Lord Keppel, a member of the same
party, and but lately at the head of the admiralty, a post which he
had resigned because he disapproved the treaty.[221] English
statesmen, too, as well as English seamen, must by this time have
learned to discount largely the apparent, when estimating the real,
power of the other navies. Nevertheless, how different would have been
the appreciation of the situation, both moral and m