met the greatest difficulty in
forming the complements, both officers and crews, for his squadron. He
took the sea, February 3, with ships 'badly manned,' as he wrote to
the minister." (Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine Francaise, p. 184.)
"During the last war [of 1778] we had met the greatest difficulty in
supplying officers to our ships. If it had been easy to name admirals,
commodores, and captains, it had been impossible to fill the vacancies
caused by death, sickness, or promotion among officers of the rank of
lieutenant and ensign." (Chevalier: Marine Francaise sous la
Republique, p. 20.)

[245] The vital centre of English commerce is in the waters surrounding
the British Islands; and as the United Kingdom now depends largely upon
external sources of food-supply, it follows that France is the nation
most favourably situated to harass it by commerce-destroying, on
account of her nearness and her possession of ports both on the
Atlantic and the North Sea. From these issued the privateers which in
the past preyed upon English shipping. The position is stronger now
than formerly, Cherbourg presenting a good Channel port which France
lacked in the old wars. On the other hand steam and railroads have made
the ports on the northern coasts of the United Kingdom more available,
and British shipping need not, as formerly, focus about the Channel.

Much importance has been attached to the captures made during the late
summer manoeuvres (1888) by cruisers in and near the English Channel.
The United States must remember that such cruisers were near their
home ports. Their line of coal-supply may have been two hundred miles;
it would be a very different thing to maintain them in activity three
thousand miles from home. The furnishing of coal, or of such
facilities as cleaning the bottom or necessary repairs, in such a
case, would be so unfriendly to Great Britain, that it may well be
doubted if any neighboring neutral nation would allow them.

Commerce-destroying by independent cruisers depends upon wide
dissemination of force. Commerce-destroying through control of a
strategic centre by a great fleet depends upon concentration of force.
Regarded as a primary, not as a secondary, operation, the former is
condemned, the latter justified, by the experience of centuries.

INDEX.

_Alberoni_, Cardinal, minister to Philip V. of Spain, 233;
naval and general policy of, 234-236;
failure of his schemes, 238;
dismissed,