e objects for which the
belligerents were at war and the proper objectives upon which their
military efforts should have been directed to compass the objects, the
discussion now considers how the military forces should have been
handled; by what means and at what point the objective, being mobile,
should have been assailed.

[235] Orders of Admiral Villeneuve to the captains of his fleet, Dec.
20, 1804.

[236] Letter of Villeneuve, January, 1805.

[237] Letters and Despatches of Lord Nelson.

[238] Life and Letters of Lord Collingwood.

[239] Burrows: Life of Lord Hawke.

[240] Of this Rodney said: "The evacuating Rhode Island was the most
fatal measure that could possibly be adopted. It gave up the best and
noblest harbor in America, from whence squadrons, in forty-eight
hours, could blockade the three capital cities of America, namely,
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia." The whole letter, private to the
First Lord of the Admiralty, is worth reading. (Life of Rodney, vol.
ii. p. 429.)

[241] The loss of Sta. Lucia does not militate against this statement,
being due to happy audacity and skill on the part of the English
admiral, and the professional incapacity of the commander of the
greatly superior French fleet.

[242] The plan of campaign traced by the Directory for Bruix became
impossible of execution; the delay in the junction of the French and
Spanish squadrons having permitted England to concentrate sixty ships
in the Mediterranean.--_Troude_, vol. iii. p. 158.

[243] The combined squadrons of France and Spain, under Bruix, reached
Brest on their return only twenty-four hours before Lord Keith, who
had followed them from the Mediterranean. (James: Naval History of
Great Britain.)

[244] The high professional attainments of many of the French officers
is not overlooked in this statement. The quality of the _personnel_
was diluted by an inferior element, owing to the insufficient number
of good men. "The _personnel_ of our crews had been seriously affected
by the events of the campaign of 1779. At the beginning of 1780 it was
necessary either to disarm some ships, or to increase the proportion
of soldiers entering into the composition of the crews. The minister
adopted the latter alternative. New regiments, drawn from the land
army, were put at the disposal of the navy. The corps of officers, far
from numerous at the beginning of hostilities, had become completely
inadequate. Rear-Admiral de Guichen