s, the question is
not only which would cost the more in the same time, but which would
most tend to shorten the war by the effectiveness of its action.

The military policy of the allies is open to severer condemnation than
that of England, by so much as the party assuming the offensive has by
that very fact an advantage over the defensive. When the initial
difficulty of combining their forces was overcome,--and it has been
seen that at no time did Great Britain seriously embarrass their
junction,--the allies had the choice open to them where, when, and how
to strike with their superior numbers. How did they avail themselves
of this recognized enormous advantage? By nibbling at the outskirts of
the British Empire, and knocking their heads against the Rock of
Gibraltar. The most serious military effort made by France, in sending
to the United States a squadron and division of troops intended to be
double the number of those which actually reached their destination,
resulted, in little over a year, in opening the eyes of England to the
hopelessness of the contest with the colonies and thus put an end to a
diversion of her strength which had been most beneficial to her
opponents. In the West Indies one petty island after another was
reduced, generally in the absence of the English fleet, with an ease
which showed how completely the whole question would have been solved
by a decisive victory over that fleet; but the French, though favored
with many opportunities, never sought to slip the knot by the simple
method of attacking the force upon which all depended. Spain went her
own way in the Floridas, and with an overwhelming force obtained
successes of no military value. In Europe the plan adopted by the
English government left its naval force hopelessly inferior in numbers
year after year; yet the operations planned by the allies seem in no
case seriously to have contemplated the destruction of that force. In
the crucial instance, when Derby's squadron of thirty sail-of-the-line
was hemmed in the open roadstead of Torbay by the allied forty-nine,
the conclusion of the council of war not to fight only epitomized the
character of the action of the combined navies. To further embarrass
their exertions in Europe, Spain, during long periods, obstinately
persisted in tying down her fleet to the neighborhood of Gibraltar;
but there was at no time practical recognition of the fact that a
severe blow to the English navy in the Stra