with the
secrecy enforced by the stern military despotism of the Empire. In
both epochs England stood on the defensive; but in the earlier war she
gave up the first line of the defence, off the hostile ports, and
tried to protect all parts of her scattered empire by dividing the
fleet among them. It has been attempted to show the weakness of the
one policy, while admitting the difficulties and dangers of the other.
The latter aims at shortening and deciding the war by either shutting
up or forcing battle upon the hostile navy, recognizing that this is
the key of the situation, when the sea at once unites and separates
the different parts of the theatre of war. It requires a navy equal in
number and superior in efficiency, to which it assigns a limited field
of action, narrowed to the conditions which admit of mutual support
among the squadrons occupying it. Thus distributed, it relies upon
skill and watchfulness to intercept or overtake any division of the
enemy which gets to sea. It defends remote possessions and trade by
offensive action against the fleet, in which it sees their real enemy
and its own principal objective. Being near the home ports, the relief
and renewal of ships needing repairs are accomplished with the least
loss of time, while the demands upon the scantier resources of the
bases abroad are lessened. The other policy, to be effective, calls
for superior numbers, because the different divisions are too far
apart for mutual support. Each must therefore be equal to any probable
combination against it, which implies superiority everywhere to the
force of the enemy actually opposed, as the latter may be unexpectedly
reinforced. How impossible and dangerous such a defensive strategy is,
when not superior in force, is shown by the frequent inferiority of
the English abroad, as well as in Europe, despite the effort to be
everywhere equal. Howe at New York in 1778, Byron at Grenada in 1779,
Graves off the Chesapeake in 1781, Hood at Martinique in 1781 and at
St. Kitt's in 1782, all were inferior, at the same time that the
allied fleet in Europe overwhelmingly outnumbered the English. In
consequence, unseaworthy ships were retained, to the danger of their
crews and their own increasing injury, rather than diminish the force
by sending them home; for the deficiencies of the colonial dock-yards
did not allow extensive repairs without crossing the Atlantic. As
regards the comparative expense of the two strategie