its, or in the English
Channel, or on the open sea, was the surest road to reduce the
fortress, brought more than once within measurable distance of
starvation.

In the conduct of their offensive war the allied courts suffered from
the divergent counsels and jealousies which have hampered the
movements of most naval coalitions. The conduct of Spain appears to
have been selfish almost to disloyalty, that of France more faithful,
and therefore also militarily sounder; for hearty co-operation and
concerted action against a common objective, wisely chosen, would have
better forwarded the objects of both. It must be admitted, too, that
the indications point to inefficient administration and preparation on
the part of the allies, of Spain especially; and that the quality of
the _personnel_[244] was inferior to that of England. Questions of
preparation and administration, however, though of deep military
interest and importance, are very different from the strategic plan or
method adopted by the allied courts in selecting and attacking their
objectives, and so compassing the objects of the war; and their
examination would not only extend this discussion unreasonably, but
would also obscure the strategic question by heaping up unnecessary
details foreign to its subject.

As regards the strategic question, it may be said pithily that the
phrase "ulterior objects" embodies the cardinal fault of the naval
policy. Ulterior objects brought to nought the hopes of the allies,
because, by fastening their eyes upon them, they thoughtlessly passed
the road which led to them. Desire eagerly directed upon the ends in
view--or rather upon the partial, though great, advantages which they
constituted their ends--blinded them to the means by which alone they
could be surely attained; hence, as the result of the war, everywhere
failure to attain them. To quote again the summary before given, their
object was "to avenge their respective injuries, and to put an end to
that tyrannical empire which England claims to maintain upon the
ocean." The revenge they had obtained was barren of benefit to
themselves. They had, so that generation thought, injured England by
liberating America; but they had not righted their wrongs in Gibraltar
and Jamaica, the English fleet had not received any such treatment as
would lessen its haughty self-reliance, the armed neutrality of the
northern powers had been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the
English emp